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Twenty-five years ago, in 1979, the approval of the Basque and 
Catalan Statutes of Autonomy marked the starting point of the 
process of decentralization in Spain. Whether sufficient or exces-
sive, whether finished or still open-ended (as political and techni-
cal opinions differ widely), this process and the resulting structure 
of political power still play a central role in the Spanish political 
debate. In this presentation I will try to discuss what has been 
achieved and what still remains to be done, from a Catalan point 
of view, as the organizers have suggested, although not solely a 
Catalan one. 
The first element to be commented on is the high legitimiza-
tion of the «Espana de las Autonomfas». It is very important to 
realize that the perception and divisiveness of the center-periph-
ery conflict are enormously stronger at the level of the elite than 
for mass opinion. All survey research has constantly shown that 
the main concerns of Spanish public opinion are unemployment, 
terrorism, security or immigration; on the other hand, State or-
ganization problems, regional powers or discussions between cen-
tral and regional governments have constantly ranked very low 
among the concerns of Spaniards. For instance, a recent study 
(Bericat et al., 2003) on «cultural conflict in Spain», which reviews 
the ways in which Spanish citizens have conflicting views on a 
number of subjects, ranging from religion to family values, man-
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agement of the economy or the Welfare State, simply pays no at-
tention to the national identity conflict: it is something that does 
not appear at the level of the masses. 
A large survey conducted by the CIS [Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociol6gicas] in September (study 2455, «Institutions and Autono-
mies»), intended to measure attitudes about the territorial struc-
ture of Spain, discloses some additional information. The decen-
tralized structure is perceived, as a whole, in positive terms by 
more than two thirds of the respondents (67.4 %), while only 
12.6 % had a negative perception. Interestingly enough, these re-
sults are not very different from the figures relating to Catalan 
respondents: among them, 71.8 % held positive views, whereas 
13.9 % would have a negative perception. Therefore, there is a 
clear phenomenon of convergence between the opinion of citizens 
from a region with strong regionalist views, such as Catalonia, 
and the average opinion of the whole country. 
It is worth noting that, given the choice among various possi-
ble institutional arrangements, about a quarter of the respondents 
(26.5 %) chose the option «Prefer regions to be more autono-
mous»; but when asked about their own region, the figure of 
those claiming for more autonomy reaches 42.4 %. In other 
words: if Spanish public opinion may be somewhat cold about 
developing the system and making its regions more autonomous, 
the majority states that their own region should indeed be more 
autonomous. 
This radical decentralization has reached deep into citizens' 
everyday life. The same CIS survey observed that 34.2 % of the 
respondents declared to be «very interested» or «interested» in re-
gional politics, while the corresponding figure for national politics 
was only 30.4 %. This can be interpreted in terms of localism, 
but it also suggests how important regional administrations have 
become. In 2003, after the devolution of health services to all re-
gions, regional governments spend the largest share of public ex-
penditure, and employ more civil servants than central govern-
ment. Regional governments have become essential players in the 
policy process, and have reached a high political visibility and 
salience. 
However, their impact on the working of the central institu-
tions of the political system is limited. We will review later what 
the situation at the administrative level is. At the parliamentary 
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level, and contrary to some widespread perceptions, the presence 
of nationalist or regionalist parties in the Parliament is limited 
(around 10 % of MP's), has not increased at all since 1986. Al-
though at times they have been required as partners to bring 
about a parliamentary majority (as happened for the Socialist 
Cabinet in 199 3 or for the first Aznar cabinet in 1996) they have 
always done it in favor of the plurality party, even if a shift in their 
alliances might have produced a Cabinet of the opposing political 
sign. 
Therefore, as a whole, reasoning in terms of regional represen-
tation, of decentralization in policies and services, as well as the 
Cebtre's abiltiy, the creation of «Comunidades Aut6nomas» must 
be termed a success. 
But not a complete one. Old and new conflicts emerge around 
the center-periphery cleavage in Spain. The most dramatic one, of 
course, is the maintenance of a terrorist group, ETA [Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna], active in the Basque Country. Although very serious-
ly hit by police and judiciary action in recent years, and by the 
French authorities' cooperation, which had led twice recently to 
the dismantlement of its directive bodies, ETA remains as a per-
manent threat for thousands of businessmen, journalists, local 
councilors or university professors (just to name a few of the pro-
fessional groups attacked since 2000). 
The banning of Batasuna, ETA:s supporting political group, in 
2003, in spite of previous fears, was not followed by a terrorist 
offensive; this has suggested that the terrorist group is very seri-
ously weakened and its days might perhaps (only perhaps) be close 
to coming to an end. But in a cruel paradox, the weakening of 
ETA in terrorist terms has come hand in hand with the break-up 
of political cooperation between political parties. The anti-terror-
ist agreements signed at the end of the 80's ( «Pacto the Ajuria 
Enea» and «Pacto de Madrid») had assured, in the past, a com-
plete political unity around anti-terrorist policies. But the agree-
ments between the PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco] revealed in 
1999 opened a new scenario: a frontal clash between «national-
ists» and «constitutionalists», i.e., PSOE [Partido Socialista Obre-
ro Espanol] and PP [Partido Popular]. The Basque regional gov-
ernment, after the departure of the PSOE, launched the so-called 
«plan Ibarretxe», which aims at weakening all linkages between 
the Basque country and Spain, with only a vague connection re-
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maining with the Crown, and fully joining the EU. These institu-
tional changes would be approved through procedures to be free-
ly established by the regional institutions (and not according to 
the provisions included in the Statute), and would finally be appro-
ved in a referendum called by the regional government (and not 
by the central government, as the current legislation establishes). 
The Basque conflict, thus intensified in the last years, and has 
clearly shifted lines; from a starting point where multi-partisan 
cooperation against terrorism was the rule, we are in a situation 
of open conflict between democratic parties. And, as is almost 
necessary in this type of conflict, it is the most extremist positions 
which prevail on each side. 
Increasingly, the PP has tended to focus all its discourse 
around the issue of national unity in danger; and, instead of lim-
iting the conflict to the Basque country and trying to gather alli-
ances outside, has tended to extend the conflict towards the So-
cialist Party, under the accusation of being mild or, even worse, 
close to forge party alliances whith parties and groups which en-
danger national unity. 
This conflicting reasoning came to a limit after the formation 
of the new Catalan regional government. After the regional elec-
tions in November 2003, which saw the departure of Jordi Pujol, 
the charismatic leader of the moderate Catalan nationalists, the 
situation at the regional Parliament was far from clear: no party 
had a majority, the party with most votes was not the party with 
most seats, and the making of a majority required an agreement 
with ERC [Esquerda Republicana de Catalunya], a traditionally 
center-left nationalist party, but increasingly leaning towards more 
radical positions, both in left-right terms, and also in national 
terms, defining itself as pro-independence. 
The negotiations between parties finally led to a left coalition, 
which includes the Socialist Party as senior member, ERC, and 
IC-V [Iniciativa per Catalunta Verds], the «green» party created by 
the former Communists. A coalition cabinet was formed, chaired 
by the Socialist Pasqual Maragall, former mayor of Barcelona and 
now President of Generalitat. 
The formation of this cabinet triggered a wave of criticisms, 
even before being sworn in. Central government members and PP 
leaders took the floor, hurling all kind of criticisms at the Catalan 
government, in an unprecedented way. And when things seemed 
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to settle down, after a discrete intervention by the King, a bomb 
exploded: on January 261h, the Madrid newspaper ABC reported 
that the second in command in the regional government and 
leader of ERC, M. Carod Rovira, had met with the top leaders of 
ETA at the beginning of the year, somewhere in Southern France. 
Although Carod abandoned the cabinet in the days that followed, 
the scandal was worsened by a press conference by ETA three 
weeks later, where two gunmen declared a separate truce for Cata-
lonia, «given the increasing electoral success of pro-independence 
parties there». 
From the PP point of view, there was a clear syllogism: ETA 
meets, and cooperates, with ERC; ERC has made the election of 
a Socialist President in Catalonia possible; therefore, the Socialist 
Party might cooperate with the terrorists. Even within the PSOE 
this line of reasoning has had some impact, as some declarations 
by Socialist leaders have made clear. 
In other words, the permanence of the terrorist generates 
waves which pollute political strategies and political discourse, 
awakening lines of reasoning completely out of touch with reality 
but which may be considered by some as being politically promis-
ing (such as the «national unity» of Spain, or some traditional and 
diffuse anti-Catalanism). For instance, the Minister of Territorial 
Administrations, Ms. Garcia Valdecasas, commenting on the Cat-
alan government, declared formally that the «Socialists were in 
coalition with murderers». 
Regional decentralization also poses some new problems. The 
first bloc of them has to do with European integration. The 1978 
Constitution was written without the possibility of joining the 
European Union in mind; thus, some matters are defined as be-
ing «exclusive power» for the regions, or for the central govern-
ment, without realizing that, once inside the Union, those mat-
ters would be in the hands of the Brussels authorities. 
A second problem on the European front is representation: 
when European bodies meet to discuss matters which depend on 
regional authorities, who should form the Spanish delegation? 
Increasingly, Spanish regions (regardless of political colors) 
demand to be present in those negotiations, something which the 
Spanish government has frontally rejected in the last years. 
Furthermore: after May 2004, ten new countries will join the 
EU, many of whom are smaller than some Spanish regions; and 
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a handful of new languages will become official within the EU, 
even if they are spoken by quite a small number of people. The 
comparisons between Catalonia and Malta, or between Andalucia 
and Estonia, or between Galicia and Slovenia, will become una-
voidable. 
A second bloc of problems has become visible in recent years: 
inter-territorial problems within Spain. As a simple example, the 
«Hydrological National Plan» intends to take water from the river 
Ebro, as it passes through Aragon and Catalonia, towards Valen-
cia, Murcia and Almeria, dry areas in the South East of Spain, 
with important problems of desertization. However, this Plan was 
approved without any negotiation with the regions from which 
water will be taken. On the contrary, the Minister was quoted as 
saying that «this will be as simple as a military parade». One 
should also recall that the PP is regionally in the opposition in 
Aragon and Catalonia, but in office in Valencia and Murcia. 
The territorial distribution of public investment and the build-
ing of infrastructure raise problems in the same vein: the spec-
tacular development of Madrid in recent years has meant a con-
centration of resources there, which were perhaps badly needed 
elsewhere. 
How can one face these problems? Among scholars and re-
searchers, an emerging consensus is that the transformation of 
Spain has only affected the powers of the regions, which is in it-
self a very important aspect, but far from sufficient. What is in-
tended as being required is the transformation of the central struc-
tures of command, based still on a centralist view and not 
reflecting accurately the changes that have occurred at the region-
al level. On the other hand, differential realities are still strong, 
and there should be no problem in certain regions having what is 
sometimes called «asymmetrical federalism» (see Aja 2003) or spe-
cific arrangements. 
In the political arena, a certain number of proposals have been 
put forward in the last few years. The first one, as mentioned, has 
been the strategy of the Aznar cabinet, and the PP as such: the 
territorial model is closed. Spain is just as federal as Germany, 
and, therefore, there are no additional steps to be taken. Further-
more: the general political evolution requires a stronger role for 
central authorities. For instance, security concerns, military in-
volvement abroad or a new leadership within Europe are fields 
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where an essential role has to be played by the central authori-
ties, thus becoming more important than in the past. In this view, 
no reform is necessary; on the contrary, often proposals for reform 
have been termed as «anti-constitutional» by the PP, thus ques-
tioning their legitimacy. 
Against this neo-centralist strategy, a group of nationalist re-
gional parties tried to rebuild the «Galeusca» platform (from the 
coalition between Galicia, Euskadi and Catalonia at the beginning 
of last century). This has taken the form of a «Barcelona declara-
tion», signed by CIU [Convergencia i Uni6], BNG [Bloque Nacion-
alista Galego] and PNV (and, later by ERC and EA [Eusko Alkar-
tasuna]), where these parties draft a joint platform, asking for a 
recognition of the multinational character of Spain, a role for re-
gional governments in Europe, reforms in the Senate and the 
Constitutional Court, etc. 
This ambitious platform, however, has not survived the acute 
confrontation about Basque politics. Although the documents were 
signed, no use has been made of them in the subsequent elector-
al campaigns, nor has any proposal emerged in parliamentary 
debates. 
For the new Socialist leadership, it has been difficult to draft 
a strategy of its own. On the one hand, a relevant group of So-
cialist leaders do not feel the need for any more decentralization: 
names such as Rodriguez Ibarra, Bono or Redondo could be in-
cluded here; it is true that this vision clashes with the views of 
their Catalan, Aragonese, Balearic or Galician comrades. But the 
major problem comes from the outside: given the strong «nation-
alist» discourse by the PP, the PSOE has been very careful in not 
opening flanks to criticism in this field, conceived as being criti-
cal for the electorate in the core of the country. 
Only recently, in September 2003, has the PSOE produced a 
policy document, named after the town were it was approved 
(Santillana). The PSOE recognizes the need for reforming the Sen-
ate (which entails reformation of the Constitution); announces 
some changes in style, in order to more or less «federalize» the 
central decision-making process; and states that in any case, re-
forms would only be acceptable and discussed if they follow the 
procedures established by the Statutes and Constitution. Therefore, 
the Ibarretxe proposal must be abandoned by the Basque Govern-
ment, as its procedures clearly differ from the legal previsions. 
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From the Catalan point of view, a first question to be exam-
ined is the role played by ERC, given its key role in the formation 
of the cabinet and its ideological definition. It is clear from its 
political stance and from its leaders' statements that a stand on 
independence is not in the agenda, at least for a long time: Mr. 
Carod's declared goal is to become the next President of the Gen-
eralitat. On the other hand, ERC is willing to play some role in 
Spanish politics, supporting the new Socialist cabinet. Therefore, 
we are not far from the Pujol style of combining a strong nation-
alist position in Catalonia, with pressure towards reform and 
modernization at the Spanish central level (and it may be appro-
priate to recall here how Mr. Camb6, the first Catalan nationalist 
leader, had to hear during a parliamentary debate that one of his 
opponents urged him to choose, «as you cannot be both the Boli-
var of Catalonia and the Bismarck of Spain»). 
The Catalan coalition government has defined, as the two 
major goals for its mandate, a reform of the funding mechanisms 
of the region, and the reforms of its Statute. On the first aspect, 
Catalonia is perceived as being under-funded Gust like Andalucia), 
as a result of a number of factors: shortcomings in the public 
investment; a relevant rate of illegal immigrants (therefore not 
included in official figures, but generating all the same costs in 
health, education and other services); an economic structure rich 
in small size industries, whose essential fiscal output is channeled 
through taxes which remain in the hands of the central govern-
ment. 
As far as the Statute is concerned, the goals of reform are less 
clear, at least for now; in any case, it is clear that some of the 
sought reforms cannot be limited to the Statute: for instance, the 
recognition of the multinational character of Spain, or the reform 
of the Senate. These aspects cannot be touched upon without 
constitutional reform. 
In which direction may things evolve? When writing this con-
tribution, we find ourselves in a completely new (and largely un-
expected) political context: the election of a Socialist cabinet, 
which has not yet entered into function. It is then too early to 
make any guess about its policies. The «Santillana» document sets 
a general framework, although later signs and statements have 
shown some more openness towards reforms; certainly, the weight 
of the Catalan change and the impulse it may have given to the 
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Socialist victory will give way to a more positive view of their 
claims. 
On the other hand, the fact that the Socialist victory was 
somewhat largely unexpected may have positive aspects. The So-
cialist Party does not have a detailed, closed previous party pro-
gram; therefore, it may be more open to exchange ideas and pro-
posals with the other parties; and, given the composition of the 
Parliament, they will need to do so, which in itself will be quite a 
positive element. 
The Feeling of relief which has followed the result of the Span-
ish General Election has not happened only in the European in-
stitutions; it has also been widely heard within Spain. 
TABLE 1 
Preferences for Institutional arrangements, 2002 
Whole country Catalonia 
Central State, without autonomies .......... .. 9,2% 6,9% 
State with autonomies, as it is now ........ .. 48,1 % 27,5% 
State with regions more autonomous than 
they are now ............................................ . 26,5% 42,0% 
State where regions might become indepen-
dent nations ............................................. .. 6,3% 17,4 % 
No answer ..................................................... .. 10,0% 8,2% 
(Source: CIS survey # 2455) 
TABLE 2 
Distribution of public expenditure by levels of government, 2003 
Central government ................... .. 
Regional governments ................ . 
Local governments .................... .. 
TABLE 3 
40,5% 
46,0% 
13,5% 
Distribution of seats in the Congreso de los Diputados, 
1977-2004 
1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 
National parties.... 327 323 326 315 313 318 318 317 317 
Regional parties.... 23 27 24 35 37 32 32 33 33 
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